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What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the 
passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as 
such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the 
universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human 
government. 
—Francis Fukuyama1 
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Few today deny the value of human rights as an idea.  But equally, few 
would deny that the reality of human rights has disappointed in many 
ways; and it this sense of disappointment which inspires the deeper 
intellectual critiques of rights, and human rights in particular.  What is 
clear, above all, is that, if we are to reinvest our conceptions of human 
rights, if we are indeed to take the idea of human rights seriously, we will 
need to use our imagination.  We will need to focus once again upon what 
the relation between humanity and rights should be. 
—Ian Ward2 
INTRODUCTION 
Suzerainty is an international legal concept and practice, perhaps now 
rarefied in the Western world, in which “a nation . . . exercises control over 
another nation’s foreign relations.”3  While the term historically has been 
applied to the acquisition of territorial lands of a nation-state by another,4 
and has somewhat of a colonial or malevolent theme, it remains a powerful 
word and idea that endures in meaning because, in a larger legal-
philosophic context, it has the potential to encapsulate and describe the 
changing and contemporary nature of national sovereignty among the 
nation-states of the world.5  Power politicians or international relations 
theory realists might plainly argue that suzerainty has been in part achieved 
with the creation of the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), the World 
Bank, the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), or the increased 
participation of the U.N. Security council “as a principal actor in the human 
rights field.”6 
Conceptually, however, “suzerainty” also fosters in the present Author’s 
mind, the skeptical contemplation of a homogenous global governance 
scheme in which a pseudo-autocratic single governmental entity might one 
day emerge (such as those envisioned by New World Order conspiracy 
theorists)7, to rule all nation-states on earth in order to enforce and effect the 
  
 2. IAN WARD, JUSTICE, HUMANITY AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 121 (2003). 
 3. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1488 (8th ed. 2004); see, e.g,. James Bacchus, A Few 
Thoughts on Legitimacy, Democracy, and the WTO, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 667, 668 (2004) 
(“The truth is, the WTO is not some ‘illegitimate’, self-aggrandizing global suzerain that 
seeks in some sinister and mysterious fashion to impose its arbitrary will on the sovereign 
nations of the world.”). 
 4. See Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838, 867 (Perm. Ct. 
Arb. 1928). 
 5. See John Alan Cohan, Sovereignty in a Post Sovereign World, 18 FLA. J. INT’L. 
L. 907, 909 (2006).  
 6. See DAVID WEISSBRODT ET AL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY, 
AND PROCESS xxxi-xxxii (2009). 
 7. See Angela P. Harris, Vultures in Eagles’ Clothing: Conspiracy and Racial 
Fantasy in Populist Legal Thought, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 269, 307 (2005); David C. 
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full respect or realization of human rights (rather than deny them).  Full 
respect or realization of human rights in this Note denotes a world situation 
where flagrant or gross human rights abuses and violations are absent on a 
pervasive scale.8  Global governance in relation to human rights9 and 
changing concepts of national sovereignty accompanying it therefore 
continue to deserve serious consideration.10 
As the hallmark or cornerstone of international law,11 national 
sovereignty has dominated the international legal landscape12 since Hobbes 
wrote of the Leviathan,13 since Locke offered his justifications for 
government,14 since Western Europe adopted the Westphalia treaty of 1648 
and gave birth to the idea of Westphalian sovereignty.15  Conceptually 
speaking, however, Westphalian national sovereignty, and sovereignty 
itself, has never truly been absolute or static—neither in concept nor 
practice.16  Neither has it been a benevolent creature or even 
  
Williams, The Militia Movement and Second Amendment Revolution: Conjuring with the 
People, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 879, 931 (1996). 
 8. See W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary 
International Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866, 875 (1990). 
It is no longer politically feasible or morally acceptable to suspend 
the operation of human rights norms until every constitutive problem 
is solved.  In the interim, new criteria for unilateral human rights 
actions must be established.  In addition, more refined techniques for 
their legal appraisal and more effective means for their 
condemnation when such actions are themselves unlawful must be 
developed.   
Id.  Minor violations on pervasive scale are therefore intolerable as well. 
 9. For some of the economic effects the changing nature of globalization has on 
national sovereignty, see Martin Wolf, Will the Nation-State Survive Globalization, 80 
FOREIGN AFF. 178, 189 (2001) (“For example, the assumption that most governments are 
benevolent welfare-maximizers is naïve. International economic integration creates 
competition among governments—even countries that fiercely resist integration cannot 
survive with uncompetitive economies, as shown by the fate of the Soviet Union.”). 
 10. Timothy W. Waters, The Momentous Gravity of the State of Things Now 
Obtaining: Annoying Westphalian Objections to the Idea of Global Governance, 16 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 25, 27 (2009). 
 11. Ivan Simonovic, State Sovereignty and Globalization: Are Some States More 
Equal?, 28 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 381, 383 (2000). 
 12. John A. Cohan, Sovereignty in a Post Sovereign World, 18 FLA. J. INT’L L. 907, 
910 (2006) (“Despite difficulty of understanding the term, sovereignty is a central concept in 
international law.”). 
 13. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN: PARTS ONE AND TWO (Herbert W. Schneider 
ed., 1958). 
 14. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., 2004). 
 15. Treaty of Westphalia, Oct. 24, 1648, 1 Parry 271; 1 Parry 119, available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/westphal.asp. 
 16. Waters, supra note 10, at 34. 
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consciousness.17  Nevertheless, the lengths to which nation-states have gone 
to protect “national security,” for example, even in the last eight years since 
9/11 and the rise of Islamofascism18 which threatens it, is indicative of the 
enduring significance and longevity the legal model retains.19  
“Sovereignty,” writes Stanford legal scholar Helen Stacy “has become the 
new obsession in international law, in international relations, in political 
science, and in sociology scholarship.”20   Renowned international legal 
scholar Louis Henkin scornfully adds: “I don’t like the ‘S’ word.  Its birth is 
illegitimate, and it has not aged well.  The meaning of ‘sovereignty’ is 
confused and its uses are various, some of them unworthy, some even 
destructive of human values.”21 
Nevertheless, while there are certain fundamental standards established 
in international law by which the sovereignty of each nation-state is now 
generally recognized in and by the world,22 the metanarrative23 of national 
sovereignty and the prevention of encroachments upon it have enduringly 
been viewed as key elements in the history and basis of international law.24  
In other words, countless international legal dilemmas have often centered 
on questions of asserting or protecting national-sovereignty.  But since the 
middle part of the twentieth century “international law has increasingly 
dealt with other entities, notably including the individual as bearer of human 
rights.”25 
Thus, since the end of World War II, the atrocities of the Holocaust, the 
Nuremburg trials, and more contemporaneously, following the atrocities 
that took place in Darfur, East Timor, Kosovo, Rwanda, and Somalia, 
among other global regions, international human rights have surfaced as 
perhaps the greatest modern challenge to nation-states’ continued exercise 
  
 17. See generally Matthew Olmsted, Are Things Falling Apart?: Rethinking The 
Purpose and Function of International Law, 27 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 401 
(2005). 
 18. See Charles W. Collier, Terrorism as an Intellectual Problem, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 
815 (2007). 
 19. See WEISSBRODT, supra note 6, at 2. 
 20. Helen Stacy, Relational Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2029, 2039 (2003) 
[hereinafter Relational Sovereignty]. 
 21. Louis Henkin, That “S” Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human 
Rights, Et Cetera (Feb. 23, 1999), in 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 1 (1999) [hereinafter Henkin 
Lecture]. 
 22. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1993, 49 
Stat. 3097; Treaty Series 881, 165 LNTS 19, available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/intam03.asp [hereinafter Montevideo]. 
 23. Olmsted, supra note 17, at 411 (“Whether classified as positivists, naturalists, 
liberals or realists, international legal scholars overwhelmingly support the universalistic 
narrative of international law.”). 
 24. See INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASE AND MATERIALS xv (Lori Fisler Damrosch et. al. 
eds., 5th ed. 2009) [hereinafter Damrosch]. 
 25. Id. 
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of Westphalian-style national sovereignty.26  It might thus be argued that 
national sovereignty and international human rights exist on a spectrum of 
sorts, with each in a sense being polar opposites; in another, more 
homogenous sense, it might argued that they are each complementary parts 
of the whole of international law.  Furthermore, it might even be argued that 
human rights strengthen the viability of national sovereignty by providing a 
sense of quasi-democratic legitimization to its survival. 
Despite these possibilities, however, in some cases, some political and 
international relations theory realists27 might say that human rights 
“frustrate” the autonomy implicit in national sovereignty and have now 
come to exceed in importance issues of asserting and protecting national 
sovereignty such as to dominate international legal dialogue;28 others might 
not.29  Yet even some others, natural law theorists among them for example, 
would say that international human rights are beginning to gain the true and 
full guarantees and protections enshrined in various international 
instruments that construe them, despite the prevalence of national 
sovereignty assertions that aim to preempt them.30  Many international 
observers and legal scholars have not only questioned the traditional 
Westphalian notion of sovereignty and what legal meaning it retains for the 
  
 26. Jianming Shen, National Sovereignty and Human Rights in a Positive Law 
Context, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 417, 417 (2000) (“[These examples] have led to revived 
debates in the United Nations General Assembly about the principle of national sovereignty 
and the prevention of humanitarian disasters.”). 
 27. See Jonathan D. Greenberg, Does Power Trump Law?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1789 
(2003). 
 28. See Thomas M. Franck, Are Human Rights Universal?, 80 FOREIGN AFF. 191, 
195 (2001); see also Eric A. Engle, The Transformation of the International Legal System: 
The Post-Westphalian Legal Order, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 23, 32 (2007) (“Realism sees the 
world as a struggle for power--essentially, a zero sum game. Norms, for realists, are enforced 
for practical reasons of state.”); see also Damrosch, supra note 24, at 7 (“‘Realists’ of 
international relations theory, who are inclined to see international law as simply a set of 
moral rules, object to the efforts of others to elevate the field to a higher status, as well as the 
imposition of “do-gooder” sentiments on the conduct of states operating in a dangerous 
world.”). 
 29. See Wolf, supra note 9, at 179. 
 30. See Henkin Lecture, supra note 21, at 4. 
The international human rights movement, born during the Second 
World War, has represented a significant erosion of state 
sovereignty.  And it took Hitler and the Holocaust to achieve that.  
Since 1945, how a state treats its own citizens, how it behaves even 
in its own territory, has no longer been its own business; it has 
become a matter of international concern, of international politics, 
and of international law.  
Id.; see also Damrosch, supra note 24, at xv-xvi (“The influence of the international human 
rights movement on the system of international law has been profound, to the point that it is 
no longer accurate to think of international law as strictly an interstate system.”); Oona A. 
Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make A Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1937–39 
(2002); Simonovic, supra note 12, at 397. 
516 Michigan State Journal of International Law [Vol. 18:3 
 
international system,31 i.e. the idea of post-Westphalian sovereignty,32 but 
also whether the full realization of international human rights would result 
in unendurable encroachments, legal or otherwise, upon such national 
sovereignty.33 
Broadly speaking, these concerns illustrate the tension that exists in 
recent history between assertions of national sovereignty and the full 
achievement of international human rights guarantees and protections by 
nation-states.34  This Note therefore aims to examine from a legal 
perspective whether full respect for (or realization of)35 human rights may 
be achieved with limited inroads upon national sovereignty.  This Note 
interrogates the changing realities of national-sovereignty as well as its 
putative demise,36 and in support of making an argument for the full respect 
of international human rights (as well as guarantees and protections) 
universally throughout the world, contemplates the unlikely possibility of an 
affirmative “one world government” (or “supranational” sovereign and 
body of laws37) exercising “suzerainty” over the existing nation-states of the 
world in order to do so.  This Note argues that while perhaps an idyllic and 
utopian legal formation, it is politically unlikely that true and full respect for 
international human rights will at some point—even far into future—result 
  
 31. Cohan, supra note 5, at 909. 
Today, sovereignty is anything but simple. There is disagreement as 
to the nature of sovereignty, whether it is a relevant sort of concept in 
geopolitics, and whether there is a one-size-fits all definition. 
Politics, economics, culture, human rights law, the advent of 
international institutions, the threat of nuclear annihilation, and the 
reality of globalization itself in a rapidly changing world-all these 
elements intersect to render sovereignty a complex subject. 
Id.  
 32. Waters, supra note 10, at 34. 
 33. See Shen, supra note 26, at 419. 
 34. This includes the mechanisms in which national sovereignty is asserted to protect 
human rights.  See Charles Sampford, Challenges to the Concepts of ‘Sovereignty’ and 
‘Intervention’, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN PHILOSOPHY AND PRACTICE 335, 349 (Burton M. Leiser 
& Tom D. Campbell eds., 2001); see also See Immanuel Wallerstein, The New World 
Disorder: If the States Collapse, Can the Nations be United?, in BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND 
GLOBAL GOVERNACE: THE UNITED NATIONS, THE STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY  172 (Albert J 
Paolini et. al. eds., 1998); Shen, supra note 26, at 446.  
 35. This Note will use the terms “respect” and “realization” interchangeably 
throughout. 
 36. Brad R. Roth, The Enduring Significance of State Sovereignty, 56 FLA. L. REV. 
1017, 1018–19 (2004) (“Since the end of the Cold War era, there has been a proliferation of 
scholarly works devoted to state sovereignty.  Most of these either approvingly announce the 
phenomenon’s decline, demise, or transformation, or else call into question whether the 
phenomenon ever existed or mattered in the first place.”). 
 37. Shen, supra note 26, at 438. 
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in or be achieved by the abolition of the nation-state and national 
sovereignty system (nor in a single “suzerain” governing world entity).38 
Instead, while this Note argues from a radical point of view, that 
national-sovereignty itself is in a sense violative of international human 
rights and “destructive of human values,” a middle road may be reached, if 
indeed it has not already, with an aggregate of networked legitimate state 
and non-state actors and participants developing a less state-centric system 
in which human rights may be fully pursued through global governance.39  
In other words, a middle road may be achieved with greater-participation-
than-exists-now of civil society in the democratization of international law 
and the creation of a global human rights governance scheme.  The 
democratization of international law would include an evaluation of the 
legitimacy of national governments in the international sphere as well as 
revisions to the “undemocratic nature of classical international law” found 
in certain key principles such as non-intervention, recognition of the 
executive’s power to make binding commitments on behalf of the State, the 
use of force, and the absence of autonomous rights in respect of remedies.40 
Furthermore, global governance would include the participation of 
organizations such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the 
Red Cross41 as well as other regional entities in some sort of unifying body 
of voice that, for example, has membership status at the United Nations.42  
Implicit in this notion of a global governance scheme is the need for better 
legal state-responsibility43 enforcement mechanisms44 and for a sua sponte 
  
 38. It is not the aim of the Note to give credence to any of the conspiracy theories 
that various politicians, for example, espouse.  Rather, the aim is to treat the possibility as a 
legal concept.  See Benjamin Sarlin, Ron Paul’s Mini-Me, THE DAILY BEAST, Aug. 21, 2009, 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2009-08-21/ron-pauls-mini-me/full/. 
 39. See, e.g., Saskia Sassen, The Participation of States and Citizens in Global 
Governance, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 5 (2003); Adam McBeth, Every Organ of 
Society: The Responsibility of Non-State Actors for the Realization of Human Rights, 30 
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 33 (2008); NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Philip 
Alston ed., 2005). 
 40. See Richard A. Barnes, Democratic Governance and International Law, 8 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 281, 283–86 (2000) (book review). 
 41. See, e.g,. Human Rights Watch, About Us, http://www.hrw.org/en/about  (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2010).  All of these organizations, for example, have had allegations of anti-
Semitism lodged against them at one time or another and thus they are by no means NGO 
panaceas for human rights violations. 
 42. See e.g. Noah Bialostozky, Overcoming Collective Action Failure in the Security 
Council: Would Direct Regional Representation Better Protect Universal Human Rights?, 15 
BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2009). 
 43. Damrosch, supra note 24, at 498; see also William H. Meyer & Boyka 
Stefanova, Human Rights, the UN Global Compact, and Global Governance, 34 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 501 (2001). 
 44. Douglas Donoho, Human Rights Enforcement in the Twenty-First Century, 35 
GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 5 (2006). 
In essence, the international system’s approach to enforcement and 
implementation of human rights has proven unrealistic in a world 
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renewed commitment from nation-states of the world to abide by 
international human rights treaties with the erga omnes positive obligation 
of “good faith” bestowed upon them by the Vienna Convention on the law 
of treaties.45  The central point that will be emphasized throughout the 
course of this Note, however, is that sovereignty has changed from being an 
international legal principle which protects borders and the legal integrity of 
sovereignty, to being an international legal principle which protects peoples 
and human rights.  Part I, therefore, examines statehood and the erosion of 
sovereignty, while Part II discusses the legal-philosophic consciousness of 
sovereignty.  Part III discusses globalization and its effects on sovereignty 
and human rights.  Part IV looks at key international instruments, discusses 
and related international human rights to national sovereignty.  Part IV 
discusses international human rights.  Part V discusses the end of national 
sovereignty and likelihood of the suzerain world polity. 
I. STATEHOOD AND THE EROSION OF SOVEREIGNTY 
An appropriate place to begin this inquiry is with the concept of the 
nation-state or statehood, the necessary preconditions for national-
sovereignty.  “Nation-states have been the foundation blocks of the 
international system since the birth of international law in modern time.”46  
They “came into existence by historical self-formation, conquest, agreement 
or revolution.”47  While the term “state” is often incorrectly used 
synonymously with “country” or “nation,” “state” (and “statehood”) is an 
international law term of art.48  Rudimentarily speaking, “[t]he [basic] 
principle of State sovereignty and sovereign equality inherently requires that 
a State refrain from interference in the internal or external affairs of another 
State.”49  Owing to this basic concept, this section addresses legal notions of 
  
characterized by oppression, autocratic governments, poverty, and 
armed conflict. Although there is no clear consensus regarding what 
enforcement of international human rights should look like, few 
would disagree that existing enforcement mechanisms remain the 
weakest link in the international human rights system. 
Id.  
 45. Generally, the Vienna Convention only applies to state signatories that have 
ratified the treaty.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(b), May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S 331.  While this is true, it is commonly accepted through the practice of 
international customary law and the principle of jus cogens that there are certain peremptory 
norms from which no derogation is permitted, irrespective of ratification of the Vienna 
treaty, among them, genocide, crimes against humanity, and wars of aggression.  Id.  See 
also MAURIZIO RAGAZZI, THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS: ERGA OMNES 44–
48 (1997). 
 46. Shen, supra note 26, at 419. 
 47. Id. at 428–29. 
 48. Roth, supra note 36, at 1023 (“Statehood is conceptualized as consummating the 
self-determination of a ‘people.’”). 
 49. Shen, supra note 26, at 420. 
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and the international history of statehood and sovereignty in order to 
establish the continuing vitality of the concept and the barrier it continues to 
pose to full respect for international human rights in the contemporary 
world. 
There are two commonly accepted theories of statehood in international 
law: the declarative and the constitutive.50  These are different from the 
philosophical conceptions of sovereignty which have influenced legal and 
political theory.51  The declarative theory posits that the existence of a state 
depends on the facts which indicate whether those facts meet the criteria of 
statehood laid down in international law.  Thus, “a state may exist without 
being recognized by other states,” but “[s]uch recognition is merely 
‘declaratory’ of an already existing statehood.”52  In contrast, the 
constitutive theory posits that “the act of recognition by other states itself 
confers international personality on an entity purporting to be a state.  In 
effect, the other states by their recognition ‘constitute’ or create the new 
state.”53 
Support for each theory may be derived on different accounts.  Because 
under the constitutive theory to determine whether an entity is a state it must 
be ascertained whether it meets the criteria of international law, acts of 
recognition or refusals to recognize have had decisive roles in determining 
controversial situations.54  In contrast, under the declarative theory, an 
“entity that de facto meets the conditions of statehood cannot, because of 
the lack of recognition, be denied certain fundamental rights or escape 
certain fundamental obligations.”55  Despite the nuanced differences 
between the theories, “the theoretical gap between the declaratory and 
constitutive views may be rather less in practice than in theory.”56  The 
theories remain significant, however, because they illustrate the 
contentiousness that may arise in diplomatic and international legal 
relations, and possible routes of resolution to various disputes through the 
invocation of the sovereignty principle.57 
Asserting the overall importance of nation-states in international law, 
Hong Kong university law professor Jianming Shen writes: 
In the exercise of their national sovereignty, States created international 
law.  The validity and effectiveness of international law depends on the 
continuing consent and support of nation-States, while the protection of 
national sovereignty and independence is contingent upon an effective 
  
 50. Damrosch, supra note 24, at 304. 
 51. Relational Sovereignty, supra note 20, at 2030. 
 52. Damrosch, supra note 24, at 304 (emphasis added). 
 53. Id. at 304. 
 54. Id. at 305. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See Cohan, supra note 5, at 925–30. 
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international legal system that is founded upon nation-States.  In 
contemporary conditions, neither States nor international law can exist 
without the other.58 
Professor Shen’s position on sovereignty is a politically realist one because 
it emphasizes the law making power of nation-states to protect their 
sovereign integrity through the international legal system.59  The terms 
“political realism” or “neo-realism,” as they are used in this Note, denote 
the relentless security competition among states, the resistance to a 
“government of governments,”60 and the view that (the absence of) anarchy 
is the organizing principle of international relations.61  Nation-states must 
provide for their own defense and security; no one can do so for them.62  
Ultimately, there may be some reality to Shen’s position that international 
law cannot exist without nation-states; for without nation-states as entities 
in the creation of international law, one must wonder how the international 
system would indeed function, and whether international anarchy would 
ensue, as power politicians often argue it would.63 
Widely respected law professor Louis Henkin, however, takes issues not 
only with sovereignty itself but implicitly neo-realist notions of it as well: 
States are commonly described as “sovereign,” and “sovereignty” is 
commonly noted as an implicit, axiomatic characteristic of statehood.  The 
pervasiveness of that term is unfortunate, rooted in mistake, unfortunate 
mistake.  Sovereignty is a bad word, not only because it has served terrible 
national mythologies; in international relations, and even in international 
law, it is often a catchword, a substitute for thinking and precision.64 
As will become apparent throughout the course of this Note, through the 
dispensation of some of these mythologies, neo-realist conceptions of 
national sovereignty—often invoked in this ‘catchword’ sense—remain a 
formidable challenge to the triumph of international human rights 
realization throughout the world.  Furthermore, this conception of 
sovereignty has fostered a legitimacy gap: who has the legitimate authority 
to speak for and to represent the peoples of various nations?65  Is it really 
only the governments of nation-states? 
Indeed, it is imperative for the contextual purposes of this Note that the 
“widening concept of international legal personality beyond the state, is one 
of the more significant features of contemporary international law.  This 
  
 58. Shen, supra note 26, at 419 (emphasis added). 
 59. Damrosch, supra note 24, at xxiii. 
 60. Greenberg, supra note 27, at 1791. 
 61. See KENNETH WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 88–89 (1979). 
 62. Greenberg, supra note 27, at 1791. 
 63. See id.  
 64. LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 8 (1995). 
 65. See WARD, supra note 2, at vii. 
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broadening is particularly evident in the case of public international 
organization, supranational entities such as the European Union, and 
insurgent communities and movements of national liberation.”66  This 
changing nature of international law is addressed elsewhere in this 
document; for the present moment, the focus remains on a brief legal history 
of sovereignty. 
A. Westphalia Treaty 
Westphalian sovereignty is the most well known in academic discourse 
and takes its name from the Treaty of Westphalia, which dealt with the 
ending of the Thirty Years War in Europe (1618–1648).67  It represented 
“the concession of some power by the emperor, with his claim of holy 
predominance, to numerous kings and lords who wished to vigilantly 
protect their own feudal powers.”68  The treaty now, however, stands for the 
“notion of the absolute right of the sovereign to exclude external actors 
from domestic authority.”69 
 
Prior to the seventeenth century, the international system was highly 
centralized.  The Catholic Church exercised spiritual dominion over Europe 
and the Holy Roman Empire exercised political control over the same.  
Gradually the Holy Roman Empire began to dissolve and was replaced by a 
system based on territorial sovereignty and the nation-state.  The watershed 
moment came with the Westphalian peace settlement of 1648, which Western 
publicists typically attribute to origins of both their discipline and the modern 
idea of sovereign equality among nation-states.70  
 
Thus, “the first [major] transformation of sovereignty occurred with the 
Peace of Westphalia, under which reformation theology transformed the 
territorial vassals of the Vatican into the nation states of Europe.”71  
Sovereignty claims precipitated by the Westphalian sovereignty revolution 
were legitimized through the rhetoric of liberation, but were not concerned 
with providing comprehensive freedom for individuals within the new state.  
Instead, the focus was on the creation and vigorous enforcement of national 
borders.72  Thus, the appropriate way of looking at Westphalian sovereignty 
is: 
  
 66. Damrosch, supra note 24, at 299. 
 67. Cohan, supra note 5, at 914. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Olmsted, supra note 17, at 410 (emphasis added). 
 71. Relational Sovereignty, supra note 20, at 2037 (“The second transformation of 
sovereignty occurred during the decolonization of the twentieth century, when ideas of 
colonial nationalism and racial equality transformed colonial supplicants into self-
determining countries.”). 
 72. Id. at 2038. 
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With the rise of nation states in the seventeenth century, however, classical 
international law gave enormous weight to the importance of state 
sovereignty, at the expense of emerging supranational human rights norms.  
Sovereignty was in large part seen as not simply an instrument for the 
promotion of the welfare of its citizens, but also as an end in itself.  The 
overwhelming focus on the intrinsic value of sovereignty was reflected in 
the view that individuals were mere objects of the international law whose 
rights existed simply as derivative of state sovereignty.73 
The Westphalia treaty precipitated the creation of nation-states as the 
“standard item of social organization” and became “the voice of 
civilization.”74  Emphasizing the inviolability of borders rather than the 
freedom of individuals, in the tradition of classical international law the idea 
of national-sovereignty would come to be the dominant philosophical and 
legal theory of international states’ organization for close to three hundred 
years. 
Scholar Eric Engle suggests, however, that the “Westphalian model of 
hermetic sovereign states promising not to intervene in their neighbors’ 
purely internal affairs lasted roughly from 1648–1989” and its de facto 
breakdown can be traced to the first and second world wars.  A system 
which had guaranteed peace and security catastrophically failed, resulted in 
the deaths of literally millions and fundamentally changed the legal rules of 
the international system.75  The notion of the nation-state exercising 
absolute sovereignty over its affairs thus significantly deteriorated in the 
middle part of the twentieth century, after World War II.76  However, a 
solemn international emphasis on “fundamental human rights, in the dignity 
and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and 
of nations large and small” emerged with creation of the U.N. Charter.77 
B. Montevideo Convention 
Before considering the U.N. Charter, it is valuable to consider the 1933 
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States78 and its relative 
importance to the nation-state.  This importance is relative to the degree that 
it illustrates the kind of international legal instrument that leads to assertions 
of sovereignty and the creation of national-sovereignty ideologies and 
  
 73. WEISSBRODT, supra note 6, at 4 (emphasis added). 
 74. Olmsted, supra note 17, at 410 (Recognizing the historical importance of the 
treaty, Olmsted writes, “Westphalia emasculated the [Holy Roman] Empire reducing it to 
one among many sovereigns, and begins a process by which the state becomes a standard 
item of social organization eclipsing the multifarious forms in existence at that time.”). 
 75. Engle, supra note 28, at 26–27. 
 76. Wallerstein, supra note 34, at 171. 
 77. U.N. Charter pmbl. 
 78. Montevideo, supra note 22. 
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myths, which are eventually used to insulate a given nation-state from 
international intervention based on human rights abuses or violations. 
Although preceding the events of World War II, the Montevideo 
Convention was one of the major international instruments crafted in 
recognition of the ever-evolving nature of international relations and 
national sovereignty.79  This Convention, though not ratified universally but 
now accepted through the international practice of customary law,80 set forth 
the requirements for recognition as a nation-state.81  As presented in the 
treaty they are: a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, 
and a capacity to enter into relations with the other states.82 
Olmsted argues that the adoption of the Montevideo Convention 
represented a shift from the Westphalian “civilization standard” employed 
by the League of Nations83 to determine statehood membership to a 
“declarative [based] one.”84  The League of Nations Covenant “did not opt 
for allowing just any community of peoples into the ‘heterogeneous’ 
international legal order, but rather only those communities considered 
nation-states [which, while] seemingly neutral and objective,” were criteria 
“loaded with Western biases.”85 
The nature and character of these biases, as part of the inquiry into the 
mythologies Henkin wrote of, will be revealed throughout this Note; 
however, from a neo-realist’s view of the international legal order, the 
Montevideo requirements represent the continuing requirements for 
recognition as a state in international customary law.  As such, they are the 
basic elements, of the national sovereignty principle, that continue to thwart 
the conception of the full realization of international human rights because 
they limit avenues by which human rights may be claimed, exercised, and 
enforced by individual peoples and legitimate non-state actors (who are not 
necessarily neo-realists).  Put another way:  
 
  
 79. Id. 
 80. H. VICTOR CONDE, A HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
TERMINOLOGY 58 (2004) (“In international law this term refers to a source of internationally 
recognized legal norms that is based on the consent of sovereign and equal states.  
Customary international legal norms are created by the existence of two elements, one 
quantitative (usage) and one qualitative (opinio juris) . . . .”). 
 81. See Cohan, supra note 5, at 919–25 (providing in depth treatment of these 
requirements). 
 82. Similar requirements are found in Resolution 2625 (XXV) (1970), which 
elaborates the principle of State sovereignty.  See Declaration on Principles of International 
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970). 
 83. Olmsted, supra note 17, at 444 (“While the League of Nations Covenant limited 
its membership to ‘fully self-governing states,’ in practice ‘the League tended away from the 
principle of homogeneous universality…towards that of heterogeneous universality.’”). 
 84. Id. at 445. 
 85. Id. (emphasis added). 
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International law is still concerned with the protection of sovereignty, but, in 
its modern sense, the object of protection is not the power base of the tyrant 
who rules directly by naked power or through the apparatus of a totalitarian 
political order, but the continuing capacity of a population freely to express 
and effect choices about the identities and policies of its governors.86  
 
As this Note endeavors to illustrate, sovereignty has thus changed from 
being an international legal principle which legally protects borders and the 
legal integrity of sovereignty, to being an international legal principle which 
legally protects peoples and human rights. 
C. U.N. Charter 
Arguably, the U.N. Charter marked the beginning of the modern erosion 
of Westphalian sovereignty and the modern ascension of human rights; 
although, following ideologically in the footsteps of the League of Nations 
efforts, one of its main purposes was to reintroduce a system of collective 
security against state aggression.87  Following the Second World War and 
the war crimes committed by the Nazi regime in Germany,88 the U.N. 
Charter was adopted and has heretofore been considered the progenitor of 
many customary international human rights law norms recognized within 
various other international legal instruments.89  Its Preamble, like Article 
1—but unlike Article 2—however, makes no explicit mention of 
sovereignty, and instead focuses on human rights: 
We The Peoples Of The United Nations Determined: to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has 
brought untold sorrow to mankind, and; to reaffirm faith in fundamental 
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal 
rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and; to establish 
conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from 
treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and; to 
promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.  
And For These Ends: to practice tolerance and live together in peace with 
  
 86. Reisman, supra note 8, at 872. 
 87. Damrosch, supra note 24, at xxvii (noting that additional developments have 
since increased “the growing importance of states representing non-Western civilizations as 
members of the family of nations” and “the growing gap between the economically 
developed and the economically less developed countries, which resulted in the creation of 
new types of international organization specifically designed to deal with the problems 
arising from the co-existence of rich and poor nations.”). 
 88. Id. at 457 (“Counsel for the accused [Nazis] argued, inter alia, (1) that 
international law is concerned only with actions of states and does not encompass 
punishment of individuals and (2) when the conduct is an act of the state, individuals who 
carry it out are not responsible.”). 
 89. See Thomas Buergenthal, The Evolving International Human Rights System, 100 
AM. J. INT’L L. 783, 784 (2003). 
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one another as good neighbors, and; to unite our strength to maintain 
international peace and security, and; to ensure, by the acceptance of 
principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be 
used, save in the common interest, and; to employ international machinery 
for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples, 
Have Resolved To Combine Our Efforts To Accomplish These Aims . . . 
.
90
 
Furthermore, Article 1, which documents the “Purposes and Principles” of 
the Charter, states: 
The Purposes of the United Nations are: . . . .  To develop friendly 
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights 
and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures 
to strengthen universal peace; [t]o achieve international co-operation in 
solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or 
humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for 
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as 
to race, sex, language, or religion . . . .91 
The Charter’s main purposes, therefore, aim for the promotion and 
encouragement of international peace, security and respect for human rights.  
However, because of the way the nation-state system operates, the 
promotion and encouragement of human rights only seems attainable when 
human rights violations occur on a gross level or humanitarian intervention 
is extended in times of armed conflict.92  “Sovereignty itself is something 
that lies primarily dormant. When a state is functioning smoothly and 
international relations are in good stead, sovereignty is in hibernation.”93  
Humanitarian intervention, unless welcomed, however, is often viewed as 
an encroachment upon the kind of sovereignty that the Westphalian notion 
espouses.94  While the Charter legally binds member states to uphold human 
rights, some scholars nevertheless argue that the Charter “says very little 
about human rights except that they are important.”95  Mendes and Ozay 
refer to this as a “tragic flaw” about mixing human rights aspirations with 
realities of national sovereignty: both seem to not succeed.96 
  
 90. U.N. Charter, pmbl. (these provisions are more or less repeated in Articles 55 and 
56 of the Charter). 
 91. Id. arts. 1–2. 
 92. See, e.g., Nikolai Krylov, Humanitarian Intervention: Pros and Cons, 17 LOY. 
L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 365 (1995). 
 93. Cohan, supra note 5, at 911. 
 94. See Michael L. Burton, Note, Legalizing the Sublegal: A Proposal for Codifying 
a Doctrine of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention, 85 GEO. L.J. 417 (1996). 
 95. ANTHONY WOODIWISS, MAKING HUMAN RIGHTS WORK GLOBALLY 24 (2003). 
 96. ERROL MENDES & OZAY MEHMET, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, ECONOMY AND LAW 1 
(2003). 
 
526 Michigan State Journal of International Law [Vol. 18:3 
 
Despite perhaps only imprecisely recognizing “the scourge of war, which 
twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind,”97 not until 
Article 2, however, does the Charter make mention of (national) 
sovereignty.  In Article 2(1) it states: “[t]he Organization is based on the 
principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.” 98 And Article 2(4), 
which is often used for support by detractors of non-U.N. humanitarian 
intervention or by detractors of unilateral use of force,99 states: “[a]ll 
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations.”100  Article 2(7) adds:  
 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of 
any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement 
under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application 
of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.101  
 
Purely from a legal point of view, this clause does not prohibit intervention 
by member states—only intervention by the U.N.  
Nevertheless, while the Charter purports to have been created for the 
“vague purpose”102 of “promoting and encouraging respect for human 
rights, [peace and security]”103 it appears to only envision doing so through 
the nation-state, national-sovereignty system which—although the drafters 
may not have consciously realized it—has something of an “anti-human 
rights” consciousness at its core.  Simultaneously, however, a paradox exists 
in that the U.N. itself is a vehicle for furthering human rights.  Furthermore, 
one might wonder whether the peace and security the Charter speaks of are 
threatened precisely when human rights abuses occur within a given 
sovereign territory. 
  
[T]he aspirations of human kind to eradicate the conditions that led 
to the Second World War and the evils that occurred during the way 
were soon overwhelmed by the tragic flaw within the nature of 
humankind.  This tragic flaw . . . is the urge in human nature, which 
is then reflected in the institutions of global governance, to seek the 
supremacy of territorial integrity over human integrity . . . . 
Id. 
 97. U.N. Charter, pmbl.  A reference to the two World Wars—but what of the 
brutality in human history that preceded this exemplification of it? 
 98. U.N. Charter, art. 2(1) (emphasis added). 
 99. See Alyn Ware, Rule of Force or Rule of Law? Legal Responses to Nuclear 
Threats from Terrorism, Proliferation, and War, 2 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 243, 252 (2003). 
 100. U.N. Charter, art. 2(4) (emphasis added). 
 101. Id. art. 2(7). 
 102. See Buergenthal, supra note 89, at 784–85. 
103
 U.N. Charter, art. 1(3). 
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Olmsted points out, for example, that “although the [U.N.] Charter lists 
among its purposes the ‘self-determination of people,’ the term ‘people’ has 
not been interpreted in the sociological [or natural law] sense, but rather 
once again within the colonial territorial framework.”104  In other words, 
people and self-determination are limited to the concept of western nation-
states, which created the Westphalian system of international law.  This is 
indeed an important point when considering the breakdown of the 
Westphalian system, as it brings to the forefront of history’s consciousness 
the historical and legal injustices permeating beneath the surface of the 
venerated national sovereignty system.105  Olmsted adds: 
Indeed, nowhere in the Charter is it suggested that the colonial nation-state 
is a nullity or that sovereignty should be returned to pre-colonial peoples 
in the process of preparing them for independence.  Rather . . . “[t]he 
Charter in fact says the opposite: it recognizes the right to political self-
determination only for those territorial units that are ‘internationally 
determined’ of which the colonies are the classic example.”  Thus, self-
determination of people under the Charter means nothing more than the 
self-determination of the colonial nation-state.106 
Referencing the work of philosopher Edward Said, Olmsted concludes “just 
as the Orient participated in its own Orientalization, the former colonies 
perpetuated their own subjugation by using self-determination as a means of 
maintaining the Western image of statehood rather than as a means of 
challenging it.”107  While this Note is not focused on the sociology or 
history of post-colonial self-determination claims, either in a historical or 
modern context,108 Olmsted’s thinking is crucial because it illustrates the 
tension among ideas of national sovereignty and human rights that emerge 
when contemplating what inroads upon sovereignty may very well be 
necessary in order to achieve full respect for human rights. 
D. Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
Arguably, further erosion upon national sovereignty was the U.N. 
General Assembly’s 1948 adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (“UDHR”).109  “The Declaration is not a treaty, [however;] it was not 
adopted as one and was ‘never submitted by states to their respective 
  
 104. Olmsted, supra note 17, at 449. 
 105. See generally Wayne Hudson, Fables of Sovereignty, in RE-ENVISIONING 
SOVEREIGNTY: THE END OF WESTPHALIA? (Trudy Jacobson et. al. eds., 2008). 
 106. Olmsted, supra note 17, at 449–50. 
 107. Id. at 451. 
 108. For such a study, see ANTHONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE 
MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 196–235 (2004). 
 109. Damrosch, supra note 24, at 976; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. 
Res. 217 (III), pt. A, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
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ratification processes.’  As such, the Declaration originally was not intended 
to constitute binding law.”110  There have, however, been efforts to 
“attribute legal character to many of the Declaration’s provisions” and 
virtually no state or government that has “come into existence has since 
questioned or expressed reservations to the Universal Declaration, and it 
continues to be cited with unanimous approval or acquiescence in 
resolutions of international bodies.”111  Thus, some parts of the UDHR may 
have become customary international law, and as a result, binding on 
international states.112 
Croatian legal scholar Ivan Simonovic identifies the momentum human 
rights have gained in international legal dialogue and the clash that occurs 
between them and national sovereignty since the UDHR: 
[T]here is an ever growing acceptance that the promotion and protection of 
human rights is a legitimate concern of the international community.  An 
increasing number of states have recognized the value of working for 
international cooperation in the area of human rights and have accepted 
various forms of human rights assistance, monitoring, and field presence 
as supplementary to national mechanisms . . . .  In spite of these clearly 
positive developments in the international protection of human rights, 
some serious obstacles still remain . . . .  Some states demonstrate their 
isolationism by rebuffing international concern for human rights in order 
to protect national sovereignty or preserve certain traditional customs, 
both of which are used as a shield for violating human rights.113 
What onus, in effect, then does the UDHR then place on nation-states to 
respect human rights, if it is not a legal one?  The answer to this question is 
essentially a politically indeterminate one.  Under customary international 
law, however, the legal answer is that there is at the minimum the “good 
faith” onus to abide by the UDHR; at the maximum, that insofar as the 
UDHR is customary law, it binds the parties as strongly as any other 
international law does. 
“Regardless of its precise legal status, [however] the Universal 
Declaration is, after the U.N. Charter, probably the most influential 
instrument in the field of human rights; it helped secure the recognition of 
human rights by states and instilled the idea and the principles of human 
  
 110. Damrosch, supra note 24, at 977 (“It is not a treaty,” said Eleanor Roosevelt in 
the General Assembly at the time of its adoption, “it is not an international agreement. It is 
not and does not purport to be a statement of law or legal obligation.”). 
 111. Id. 
 112. See Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 
National and International Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 287, 289 (1995/1996) (“Many 
of the Universal Declaration’s provisions also have become incorporated into customary 
international law, which is binding on all states.”). 
 113. Simonovic, supra note 11, at 389 (emphasis added). 
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rights into the national constitutions and laws of virtually all states.”114  
This statement overlooks, however, the indispensable importance and 
contribution that the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights,115 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights116 have made in the field of human rights. 
The response by the international community in the form of the UDHR is 
nonetheless illustrative of the desire to prevent the barbarous acts that 
humankind had committed leading up to and including the Holocaust.117  
This instrument should, therefore, be seen as reflective of a response to the 
atrocities committed by the Nazis, but also of the atrocities and acts of 
barbarism that have occurred in history leading up to its declaration.118  Seen 
in this light, the reality emerges that human rights have been part and parcel 
with sovereignty119 since “divine right” enabled kings to absolutely rule 
other human beings; however, respect for human rights still sometimes 
seem to be subordinated to exercises and claims of national sovereignty in 
the international system. 
E. U.N. Resolution 2625 (XXV) 
Finally, in this Part, there is one more instrument to briefly consider 
which illustrates the primacy that the international community has placed on 
national sovereignty and the tension between diverging points of view of 
sovereignty vis-à-vis human rights written about in this Note’s Introduction.  
This instrument is U.N. Resolution 2625 (XXV) (1970), which elaborates 
the principle of State sovereignty by providing: 
All States enjoy sovereign equality. They have equal rights and duties and 
are equal members of the international community, notwithstanding 
differences of an economic, social political or other nature. 
In particular, sovereign equality includes the following elements: 
(a) States are juridically equal; 
  
 114. Damrosch, supra note 24, at 978 (emphasis added). 
 115. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, opened for 
signing Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 368 [hereinafter 
IECSCR]. 
 116. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 117. See Henry A. Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction, 80 FOREIGN AFF. 
86, 87 (2001). 
 118. WEISSBRODT, supra note 6, at 8–10. 
 119. See id. at 2 (“[O]ne can trace the origins of human rights back to early 
philosophical, religious, and legal theories of the “natural law,” a law higher than the positive 
law of states (such as legislation).”). 
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(b) Each State enjoys the rights inherent in full sovereignty; 
(c) Each State has the duty to respect the personality of other States; 
(d) The territorial integrity and political independence of the State are 
inviolable; 
(e) Each State has the right freely to choose and develop its political, 
social, economic and cultural systems; 
(f) Each State has the duty to comply fully and in good faith with its 
international obligations and to live in peace with other States.120 
While this Resolution is an example of international soft law, as U.N. 
resolution are generally non-binding, several other General Assembly 
resolutions and documents have repeatedly stressed the importance of the 
principles of state sovereignty, non-intervention, and non-use of force; for 
example, Resolution 2131 (XX) (1965) which declares that “[n]o State of 
group of States has the right to intervene or interfere in any form or for any 
reason whatsoever in the internal and external affairs of other States.”121  
But from the neo-realist perspective: 
[W]hile the General Assembly does not possess the legislative power to 
pass binding resolutions, its importance in manifesting the general attitude 
of UN members cannot be underestimated; especially where the same 
principles have been repeatedly declared and reaffirmed.  The various 
declarations and resolutions mentioned above, together with relevant 
Charter provisions and other treaty provisions, provide weighty evidence 
that the principle of State sovereignty and its corollaries are essential to 
the existence and proper functioning of the United Nations and the entire 
system of international law as a whole.122 
If this assertion is correct that sovereignty is essential to international law 
and for the time being preempts all other international concerns including 
human rights in order to make the international system work, where do we 
go from here?  Maybe the case is that national sovereignty is essential to the 
international law system, but does not in fact preempt international human 
rights? 
The answers to these questions perhaps lie in the middle road creation of 
a global governance framework in which the state as well as other 
  
 120. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations 
and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
(XXV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970). 
 121. Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal 
Affairs of States, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/103 (Dec. 9, 1981).   
 122. Shen, supra note 26, at 427. 
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legitimate international actors and participants create a less state-centric or 
decentralized political and legal framework, perhaps sanctioned by the 
international community, in which full respect for human rights may 
culminate.123  Such a global governance scheme need not be realized in a 
single “suzerain” entity, as this Note endeavors to illustrate, but rather in a 
body of networked legitimate (state and) non-state actors such as NGOs, or 
“civil society,”124 aggregated at a greater level than currently exists in the 
world.  Nevertheless, the preceding discussion illustrates the political and 
legal tension that exists between national sovereignty and human rights; it 
lays the framework for the points to follow.  Perhaps the two most 
important international human rights instruments, the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,125 and International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,126 are reserved for discussion in the 
Human Rights section of this Note. 
II. SOVEREIGNTY AND LEGAL-PHILOSOPHIC CONSCIOUSNESS 
“Sovereignty,” writes law professor Brad Roth, “is not an empirical 
condition, but a legal status.”127  The concept of the Westphalian nation-
state is, therefore, reflective of a particular legal idea we have of the state—
one that has perhaps been historically engrained in our consciousness.128  
This vision of the nation-state, as detailed in the Westphalia treaty, the 
Montevideo Convention and U.N. Resolution 2625, for example, in some 
ways, eclipses our capacity to envision a world where full respect for human 
rights may be achieved because we insist on forcing them into the template 
of the national sovereignty system and thereby, circumscribing them to the 
needs or purposes of the nation-state.  In other words, “[w]hile international 
law’s metanarrative portrays the nation-state standard as a step toward 
  
 123. See WARD, supra note 2, at 85–86. 
 124. See  CONDE, supra note 80, at 33. 
 125. ICESCR, supra note 115. 
 126. ICCPR, supra note 116. 
 127. Roth, supra note 48, at 1025 (emphasis added). 
 128. Relational Sovereignty, supra note 20, at 2048. 
The key point is that philosophical and political ideas about human 
identity and human behavior have played a dialectical role in 
constructing political and legal beliefs about sovereignty.  
Sovereignty is a concept that reflects both the historic conditions at 
the time of its initial conception, and the philosophical and 
intellectual moods of that moment.  In other words, the conceptions 
of sovereignty at the foundation of legal and political theory arose 
out of the contingencies of history, rather than as the result of any 
imminent logical necessity in history or in the development of 
political thought. 
Id.; see also BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN 
AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (2006). 
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universality and objectivity . . . .  The nation-state itself can be viewed as a 
metaphorical prison that incarcerate[s] innumerable diverse communities of 
cultures, peoples, and histories.129 
Because of this metaphorical national sovereignty yoke on our 
consciousness, it seems to make little difference that we have international 
human rights instruments which purport to place primacy upon human 
rights or at least on par with national sovereignty protections.  One scholar 
claimed, based on an empirical study she performed:  
 
[G]iven that I find not a single treaty for which ratification seems to be 
reliably associated with better human rights practices and several for which it 
appears to be associated with worse practices, it would be premature to 
dismiss the possibility that human rights treaties may sometimes lead to 
poorer human rights practices within the countries that ratify them. 
 
 If this is an accurate assessment of the current reality, is this assertion not 
then evident or indicative of a problem with the global consciousness and 
political will rather than insufficient international legal protection and 
enforcement mechanisms for human rights?  Stated another way, “despite 
the impressive structure of human rights agencies and notwithstanding the 
energy and action driving the creation of international human rights system, 
the world remains full of human rights atrocities.”130  Another scholar adds, 
“whilst we are possessed of more and more rights, in more and more 
charters, nothing it seems can prevent the systematic exercise of the most 
  
 129. Olmsted, supra note 17, at 448–49. 
These imaginative geographies were neither neutral nor universal but 
rather were based on Western values, biases and practices.  Just as 
the disciplines make the individual, and the Orientalists create the 
Orient, international law fabricated these nation-states as a means of 
control and subjugation.  International law chose the nation-state 
over the civilization standard for the same three reasons that the 
carceral city was chosen over the punitive city.  First, the nation-state 
acts as a buffer between the international community and nationalist 
groups in the colonies, which the West perceived as immoral, 
irrational, and a threat to the stability of the international legal order.  
It therefore silences resistance.  Second, with the expansion of the 
Family of Nations, international law needed a means of subjugation 
and control that could be effective against a potentially large number 
of subjects.  The nation-state provided such a mechanism by 
reducing the number of international actors to a relatively small and 
controllable lot.  Finally, because the nation-state is a normalizing 
judgment that is also hierarchically structured, it provided a subtle 
and efficient means of enforcing conformity and eliminating 
difference with each nation-state acting as a normalizing gaze over 
the peoples within its borders. 
Id. 
 130. HELEN M. STACY, HUMAN RIGHTS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: SOVEREIGNTY, CIVIL 
SOCIETY CULTURE 6 (2009). 
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gruesome acts of inhumanity across the globe.”131  These positions appear to 
be a static world views rather than dynamic ones.  However, in the present 
author’s mind, it would be folly to label the incremental fashion in which 
international evolves to be “dynamic” as it would be to call it “static.”  
International law moves slowly and for all intents and purposes in this Note, 
it is a changing phenomenon, but not a “dynamic” one. 
It is thus the present Author’s contention that the insistence on 
geographical or territorial boundaries as the locus classicus, as it were, of 
national sovereignty, has resulted in the world’s international human rights 
imaginary being almost perpetually constrained.  Furthermore, this 
constraining keeps the individual’s place in the international social order 
incomplete or crudely reductionist. 132 The Hobbesian notion of sovereignty, 
for example, creates a simple psychological paradigm that ascribes to each 
human “only enough agency to prefer order to chaos” and fashions each 
human as a subject who “is concerned only with keeping chaos at bay,  asks 
no more of the sovereign than to repel external threats and keep the peace at 
home.” 133 
Similarly, the Lockean paradigm gives each human enough agency 
merely to cede the authority to ensure that the sovereign protects private 
property.134  But even though Locke’s sovereignty describes a more 
complex social relationship by containing the dialectic of right and duty 
between sovereign and citizen, its fundamental preoccupation with the 
border of the nation state remains.  “Human relationships are still 
determined by their containment within national borders.”135 
Ideologically, there seems to be a tendency to think of respect for 
international human rights as being limited to or characterized by the 
actions and behaviors performed by the states in which we live, rather than 
being, on their own, transcendent of the spacial, temporal or legal 
boundaries of the state—real, imagined, or otherwise.  In this vein, Louis 
Henkin reiterates how our consciousness is affected by the national 
sovereignty system: 
It is part of my thesis that the sovereignty of states in international 
relations is essentially a mistake, an illegitimate offspring.  Sovereignty 
began as a domestic term in a domestic context.  It referred to relations 
between rulers and those they ruled, between the “Sovereign” and his or 
her subjects.  Its application to modern states—a state is not a person, but 
an abstraction—and its relation to other abstractions, such as the 
  
 131. WARD, supra note 2, at 143. 
 132. Relational Sovereignty, supra note 20, at 2047–48. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
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governments which represent states, has inevitably brought distortion and 
confusion.136 
It is the present Author’s contention that this distortion and confusion 
have placed limits on the ways in which national sovereignty and the human 
rights we are endowed with by natural law are conceived of by individuals 
in the global polity.  The present Author does not espouse nor particularly 
believe the words of Henry Kissinger or any other power politician or neo-
realist, for example, who argue that the state exists only for its own its own 
sake and in furtherance of its own purposes.137  Indeed, of what use is state 
or national sovereignty to the people in the world who are by their 
governments or others being raped, burned, mutilated, crucified, flogged, 
burned, terrorized, denied education, kept hungry, prevented from working, 
forced into marriage, kept in poverty, and summarily executed among other 
violence?138  Henkin asks similar questions.139 
  
 136. Henkin Lecture, supra note 21, at 2. 
 137. See generally Kissinger, supra note 117. 
 138. For the “United Nations . . . limited attention to the cause of victims,” see  
Theo van Boven, The Perspective of the Victim, in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS: FIFTY YEARS AND BEYOND 13 (Yael Danieli et al. eds., 1999). 
 139. Henkin Lecture, supra note 21, at 9–10.  
Who is sovereign when the state is helpless against local terrorists, or 
against suicide bombers?  Who is sovereign, or what can sovereignty 
do, against ethnic conflict within or across state borders, against civil 
war, whether it spills over into other territories?  And how sovereign 
is a state if it cannot prevent genocide?  And then, there are other 
kinds of terrible things: what can sovereignty do for (or against) 
floods of refugees or internally displaced people? . . . If the state 
system is losing control, if it is exploding, is state sovereignty 
perhaps also imploding?  If a government no longer has control 
within a state’s territorial boundaries, who does?  Can there be a 
sovereign state with nobody in control?  If what happens inside a 
state’s territory is no longer subject to effective internal control, who 
is in charge?  Who in the state system is responsible for genocide 
within the former Yugoslavia?  Who is responsible for ethnic 
cleansing, for crimes against humanity, for war crimes, for internal 
wars, and for terrorism, whether internal, transnational, or 
international? . . . Or—helplessly—who is responsible for the 
devastating consequences of natural disasters--floods, hurricanes, 
and earthquakes that have devastated economies and blighted hopes 
for economic and social development, and economic and social 
rights for hundreds of millions of people seeking human dignity?  
Who is responsible for the recurrent problem of terrorism, 
transnational or international, or for drug smuggling and people 
smuggling, and various other forms of international crime, or for 
internal crimes which states cannot or will not address, or may even 
promote or condone? 
Id.  
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The present Author instead believes that human rights are indeed natural 
rights: something all of humankind is endowed with as a matter of human 
existence and should not depend on the state to create through law.  Human 
rights are universal, inherent, and inalienable, meaning everyone has them, 
is born with them, and cannot be given or taken away (except they can be 
limited in certain circumstances).140  Rather the state should, as part of its 
function as an apparatus of international organization, respect, guarantee 
and protect either positively or negatively, but preferably positively, all of 
our human rights and provide the forum to ensure they are respected, and 
when they are violated, the forum to have them remedied without regard to 
carefully politicized and artfully litigated legal procedures or norms that 
often enable them to be avoided or not complied with. 
But how then is this discussion dispositive to law?  It is dispositive 
because it illustrates the tired modalities of international legal thinking and 
consciousness: problems are always seen in contrast or in opposition to one 
another; even the present Author, for example, suggested national 
sovereignty and human rights might be seen as polar opposites—an 
example of the positivist yoke that has been placed on our consciousness.141  
Yet, even when national sovereignty is exposed for what it is, neo-realists 
will always attempt to reconcile national sovereignty on some basis of 
political or legal legitimacy that prevents ensuing anarchy. 
The extreme view that human rights are more important than national 
sovereignty is contrary to the reality under positive law, and is in particular 
incompatible with the principles of sovereign equality, non-intervention, 
and prohibitions on the use of force.  Despite the importance of 
international promotion and protection of human rights, it would be 
misleading simply to maintain preeminence of individual rights over 
national sovereignty.  These two categories of rights, though somewhat 
contradictory to one another, do not have to be viewed as “enemies” with 
one “conquering” the other.  In my opinion, neither should national 
sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention be used as a shield 
behind which a State can act in wanton and unrestrained disregard for its 
international obligations relating to fundamental rights and freedoms of 
individuals or groups of people, nor should the need for respect and 
protection of human rights be used and indeed abused to disrespect and 
undermine the sovereignty, inviolability and dignity of States.  Instead, the 
relationship between national sovereignty and individual rights should and 
can be complementary.  When one deals with the legal relationship 
between national sovereignty and human rights, both categories of rights 
  
 140. Conde, supra note 80, at 111. 
 141. See Radhika Withana, An Alternative Theoretical Approach for Understanding 
the Relationship Between International Law and State Behaviour During International 
Crises: International Law as Ideology, in POWER, POLITICS, LAW: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
STATE BEHAVIOUR DURING INTERNATIONAL CRISES 61–89 (Radhika Withana ed., 2008) for 
an illustrative example. 
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should be viewed in the context of positive international law rather than 
from perspectives of value, religion, culture and ideology.142 
While such a view aims to defend national sovereignty, and aims to 
benevolently classify it as a corollary to international human rights it is in 
reality is perhaps little else but an undisguised attempt at legitimizing the 
practices of states which abuse human rights, such as Iran or Burma, for 
example.143 
From a legal point of view, however, we must accept the additional fact 
that globalization has brought about fundamental changes in the world, 
especially in relation to human rights and that a polar spectrum, if it ever 
were apposite, is no longer extant.  We need to dispense with these old 
modalities of legal thinking, and in the spirit of the technology that governs 
our modern economics and communications, create an interconnected 
international legal system of governance that goes beyond merely nation-
states consolidated in the U.N.  We have outgrown the Westphalian 
national-sovereignty system, and we cannot continue to allow the neo-
realists’ dying vision of a short, nasty, brutish world bring us down with 
their relentless pursuit of state power.  We must instead cautiously embrace 
globalization and recognize it is as the impetus for a new form of global 
governance for human rights.144 
III. GLOBALIZATION AND ITS EFFECTS ON SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 
The post-World War II flourishing of human rights can be mostly 
attributed to globalization.145  Globalization may be understood, generally, 
to mean “those processes which tend to create and consolidate a unified 
world economy.”146  But globalization “is a journey toward an unreachable 
destination”—a chosen, not a destined, world where neither geographic 
distance nor national borders impede the flow of commerce.147  Noting that 
globalization has serious negative effects as well,148 it is impossible to 
address the full panoply of globalization’s effects on national sovereignty 
and human rights in a space as short as this; however, it may be done so 
amply in the context of international law and human rights.  
  
 142. Shen, supra note 26, at 435–36 (emphasis in original). 
 143. See, e.g,. S.I. Strong, Law and Religion in Israel and Iran: How the Integration 
of Secular and Spiritual Laws Affects Human Rights and the Potential for Violence, 19 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 109 (1997). 
 144. For a need to do so cautiously, see BENJAMIN BARBER, JIHAD VERSUS MCWORLD 
53 (1992). 
 145. Franck, supra note 28, at 193. 
 146. WILLIAM TWINING, GLOBALISATION & LEGAL THEORY 4 (2000). 
 147. Wolf, supra note 9, at 178, 182. 
 148. See NOAM CHOMSKY, PROFIT OVER PEOPLE: NEOLIBERALISM AND GLOBAL ORDER 
20-28 (1999). 
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If there is a single phenomenon most relevant for the various 
developmental trends and relevant for sovereignty of the state and its 
future, it is globalization.  Globalization itself is not an entirely new 
phenomenon.  There have always been some global travelers, global 
exchange, and global aspirations.  There have also always been global 
problems, but the human capacity to create them, or to solve them, was 
lacking.  There was a certain awareness of globality [sic] and global 
concerns, but there was no real possibility to influence them.  Therefore, 
the problems were simply registered and accepted as a part of our 
destiny.149 
Stacy identifies globalization as presaging the new major revolution in 
the nature of sovereignty.150  Henkin adds that the international human 
rights movement is the next major transformation in sovereignty.151  Stacy 
argues that “there is a general consciousness among people that historical 
circumstances are altering in significant ways.”152  She asks, “[w]hat is the 
phenomenon of globalization, and how might it suggest a new analysis of 
the relationship between individuals and the nation state?”153  Henkin 
answers, perhaps to the dismay of ardent neo-realists or power politicians: 
“[t]here is growing, though grudging, realization that world economic 
affairs, world communications, and inevitably, therefore, world politics, are 
no longer cabined within the state system.”154 
Kofi Annan, former U.N. Secretary-General said: “[s]tate sovereignty, in 
its most basic sense, is being redefined by the forces of globalization and 
international cooperation.”155  Another scholar adds: 
Over the past decade, globalization has transformed the territorial and 
moral status of the nation state.  The older rhetoric of sovereignty as either 
Hobbesian protectorate or Lockean concern for citizens’ property rights 
needs rejuvenation to emphasize instead the dynamic interactions among 
sovereign states and among the citizens of those states—interactions that 
have been with us since the Silk Road but that have become crucial with 
globalization.  While powerful states still maintain sovereignty in respect 
of issues of security, “the era of sovereignty as a universal organizing 
principle for the management of the global system has ended.”  It is a 
  
 149. Simonovic, supra note 11, at 385. 
 150. Relational Sovereignty, supra note 20, at 2039. 
 151. Henkin Lecture, supra note 21, at 3–4. 
 152. Relational Sovereignty, supra note 20, at 2040. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Henkin Lecture, supra note 21, at 6–7; see also Elliot Meyrowitz, What Does 
Law Have to do with Nuclear Weapons?, 9 MSU-DCL J. INT’L L. 305, 305 (2000). 
 155. Press Release, The Secretary General, Secretary-General Presents his Annual 
Report to General Assembly, SG/SM/7136, GA/9596 (Sept. 20, 1999), available at 
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patchwork development, with different effects in different parts of the 
world.156 
While the present Author cannot debate at great length the veracity of the 
assertion that “the era of sovereignty as a universal organizing principle for 
the management of the global system has ended,” it is should be apparent 
that national-sovereignty is at least undergoing significant changes with the 
continually evolving international emphasis on human rights and the advent 
of modern globalization.  Another way of saying this is that “the magic aura 
of the state is disappearing”157 as human rights become more important in 
and to the world.  The formation of the European Union (“EU”) or the 
World trade Organization (“WTO”) are excellent examples of the 
globalized changing nature of sovereignty in the international context and 
how the concept may actually mean something different in various parts of 
the world.  For example, individual states within the EU “no longer 
maintain either complete external or internal sovereignty because of their 
legal compact to observe European laws in ways that constrain both 
domestic regulation and also their interactions with other nation states.  Yet 
considered as a unit, the European Union retains substantial external 
powers.”158  In this sense, might the EU be viewed as a suzerain entity of 
sorts and provide a suzerain model for human rights?  Perhaps it might.159 
If, in “a new century of further globalization, integration and 
interdependence, the concepts of nation-States and sovereignty will almost 
certainly face greater tests and challenges,”160 is it still possible to conceive 
of a suzerain entity, a one world government, that might emerge to govern 
the international community and to ensure compliance with international 
human rights?  The present Author does not think it is possible because not 
only would the national sovereignty system not allow it, the experiences of 
historical, religious, and cultural differences almost indefinitely foreclose 
such a possibility as well.161 
  
 156. Relational Sovereignty, supra note 20, at 2030–31 (emphasis added). 
 157. Wallerstein, supra note 34, at 182. 
 158. Relational Sovereignty, supra note 20, at 2038. 
 159. See EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, THE ECHR IN 50 QUESTIONS 3 (2009), 
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 160. Shen, supra note 26, at 442. 
 161. Id. at 442–43.  
Some have characterized the proliferation of international law norms 
and public international organizations in the latter part of the 20th 
century as a trend toward “multilateralization,” and even conjectured 
that this alleged trend “has so fundamentally transformed the 
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The horrible atrocities that occurred in Kosovo, Rwanda, and Darfur, and 
the continuing chaos amidst the Arab-Israeli conflict, all putatively 
motivated in part by historical, cultural, religious, or ethnic differences, are 
prime examples of differences—namely valorized ideologies—which do not 
easily die off in the pursuit of something greater than simple respect for 
another human being’s rights.162  The nation-state normally defines identity 
and a sense of belonging is part of a peoples’ concept of security; realities 
that most people would not want to forfeit in the age of globalization.163  
Therefore, even at the most rudimentary level to conceive of a supranational 
entity which governed or ruled nation-states in respect of human rights 
seems quixotically imaginative. 
Indeed, for reasons of history and the prevalence—albeit decaying 
prevalence—of the national sovereignty system, while it seems implausible 
to conceive of a situation where a world government would (legally) 
emerge, it is not necessarily impossible as evidenced by the creation of such 
entities as the EU; IMF Organization of American States; U.N.; U.N. 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation; World Intellectual Property Organization; World Health 
Organization; and WTO among others. 
Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss, for example, envision the creation of a 
diverse “global parliament.”164  Their theory shows that, with the advent of 
modern globalization,165 the emergence of a global governance scheme with 
a multitude of participants—not just nation-states—is not inconceivable.166  
Such an assertion holds promise if this account of the current state of affairs 
is accurate: 
The process of globalization will continue and intensify.  Integration of the 
world’s economy, trade, and financial flows will progress.  International 
and transnational interaction will increase, requiring improved 
coordination and further development of international regulatory 
  
character of international law that even the term ‘international law’ is 
an anachronism.”  However, it is doubtful nation-States will ever be 
ready in a considerable period of time to dissolve themselves and 
reform into, or subject themselves to, a world government.  National 
identity and national interests will continue to matter.  Existing 
cultural, ethnic, religious, philosophical and other differences 
between nation-States are such that they will not easily die off. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 162. See Nathaniel Berman, The International Law of Nationalism: Group Identity 
and Legal History, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ETHNIC CONFLICT 25 (David Wippman ed., 
1998); Diane F. Orentlicher, Citizenship and National Identity, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
ETHNIC CONFLICT 296 (David Wippman ed., 1998). 
 163. Wolf, supra note 19, at 190. 
 164. See Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, Towards Global Parliament, 80 FOREIGN 
AFF. 212 (2001). 
 165. Globalization is not a new phenomenon; it is just occurring in a new form. 
 166. See generally Sassen, supra note 39. 
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mechanisms.  National governments—under the pressure of their 
citizens—will seek agreements and partnership relation with other national 
governments, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, 
and multilateral corporations . . . .  The role of states will continue to 
change.  Their role as a security and economic framework is decreasing. 
Global or regional organizations such as the United Nations (Security 
Council), the OSCE, and NATO are taking over quite a number of 
international peace and security tasks.  Global trade and economy are 
being increasingly influenced by World Trade Organization, international 
business practices leading to development of international law, and 
arrangements by various associations of states, such as European Union, 
MERCOSUR, or the North American Free Trade Act . . . .  Instead, the 
state is shifting its role towards a framework for the protection and 
promotion of traditions, culture, language, and specific values and 
interests.  Perhaps this is the explanation of the seemingly contradictory 
processes of the decrease of the role of the state, and, at the same time, the 
increase of the number of states, and the pressure to create new national 
states.167 
Notwithstanding the pressure in the international community to create new 
states (out of former colonies and those seeking independence), in support 
of creating a global governance scheme, “for those who care about human 
rights, the need is to work to make the state system more human rights-
friendly, even in the age of globalization, even taking globalization into 
account.”168  Once the international system is made more “human-rights 
friendly” it becomes apparent that the changing nature of sovereignty 
emphasizes the protection of peoples rather than the protection of borders 
and territories.  One could even say that, transformatively, sovereignty (or 
popular sovereignty) becomes an international human right.169 
  
 167. Simonovic, supra note 11, at 401. 
 168. Henkin Lecture, supra note 21, at 7. 
 169. Sampford, supra note 34, at 349; see also Reisman, supra note 9, at 869.  
Although the venerable term ‘sovereignty’ continues to be used in 
international legal practice, its referent in modern international law is 
quite different.  International law still protects sovereignty, but—not 
surprisingly—it is the people’s sovereignty rather than the 
sovereign’s sovereignty.  Under the old concept, even scrutiny of 
international human rights without the permission of the sovereign 
could arguably constitute a violation of sovereignty by its “invasion” 
of the sovereign’s domaine réservé.  The United Nations Charter 
replicates the “domestic jurisdiction-international concern” 
dichotomy, but no serious scholar still supports the contention that 
internal human rights are “essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state” and hence insulated from international law. 
Id. 
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This view of popular sovereignty is not necessarily new of course, as for 
example, the preamble to the United States Constitution recognized the 
sovereignty of the people with its now famous declaration:  
 
We the People [and] . . . inaugurated the concept of the popular will as 
the theoretical and operational source of political authority.  Political 
legitimacy henceforth was to derive from popular support; 
governmental authority was based on the consent of the people in the 
territory in which a government purported to exercise power.  At first 
only for those states in the vanguard of modern politics, later for more 
and more states, the sovereignty of the sovereign became the 
sovereignty of the people: popular sovereignty.170 
 
However, this remains the crucial point in this Note.  Sovereignty has 
changed from being an international legal principle which protects borders 
and the legal integrity of sovereignty to being an international legal 
principle which legally protects peoples and human rights.  In this sense, it 
is then at least partially true that the “era of sovereignty as a universal 
organizing principle for the management of the global system has ended.”171  
Though arguably only decayed or “decomposed/recomposed”172 instead of 
dead, older concepts of national sovereignty have through their demise 
paved the way for sovereignty based on peoples and human rights to 
emerge.  It need not be a suzerain entity which emerges to enforce this 
changed sovereignty, but rather as Falk and Strauss suggest, perhaps a 
global parliament which promotes their protection—an ideal which is 
inherently a democratic one, and perhaps even a flawed one at that.173  The 
difference between a suzerain entity and a global parliament is that the 
former is envisioned as anti-democratic and somewhat autocratic while the 
latter is seen as democratic, taking into account the regionalism that on a 
participatory level globalization has brought about. 
The preceding analysis has sought to demonstrate “that the nation state is 
shrinking under the conditions of globalization; or at least, it is at risk of 
becoming less relevant.”174  It is worthwhile here to take a moment to point 
out that certain human rights scholars see globalization as an impediment to 
socio-economic human rights, and instead see development as the answer to 
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better respect for human rights in the world.175  They argue that 
organizations such as the IMF, the WorldBank, and the WTO serve the 
purposes of industrialized and developed nations in the neo-liberal 
economic order.176  Irrespective of the validity of such an assertion, in the 
contemporary world, from a Henkinian point of view, the interstate system, 
instead of organizing itself around sovereignty as state interest, ought to be 
organizing itself around human values.177  In other words, sovereignty in a 
globalized world should be continually focused on ensuring and protecting 
human rights as much as the security of the state, if not more.  
IV. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
While the preceding discussions detailed the erosion of national 
sovereignty through the changing norms of the concept and the resultant 
primacy placed on human rights in the twentieth century, as well as the 
effects of globalization on human rights, this part is devoted to detailing 
international human rights and some of the effects that national sovereignty 
has contributed in the failure to heretofore secure full respect or realization 
of human rights throughout the world.  Its aim is to add the last necessary 
component to this Note, before finally making a normative claim on 
whether full respect for human rights requires the abolition of the nation-
state, or whether some middle ground may be reached in which both 
national sovereignty remains intact (partially or otherwise) and full respect 
for human rights is realized.  This Note asserts that the protection of human 
rights against the state are, historically at least, inroads upon national 
sovereignty. Stated another way, “[t]he most fundamental point about 
human rights law is that it establishes a set of rules for all states and all 
people . . . [i]n this sense, the international law of human rights is 
revolutionary because it contradicts the notion of national sovereignty—that 
is, that a state can do as it pleases in its own jurisdiction.”178 
As is to be expected, “human rights principles, norms, and institutions 
[are] an indispensable aspect of understanding the inter-relationship 
between states, as well between states and those persons within their 
territory and under their control.”179  Although human rights are not 
necessarily a new phenomenon,180 and have a long and diverse history,181 
they have only recently, as we have seen, in the last sixty years been taken 
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as universal and one of the foremost components of the international 
system.182 
However, full respect for human rights in the totality of the international 
legal sphere tragically seems to remain aspirational.  “While the language 
and the law of human rights create higher and higher expectations of good 
behavior, governments fail in their human rights responsibilities every day.  
International human rights reality still routinely lags behind human rights 
aspirations.”183  Such a reality is problematic as far as the present Author is 
concerned, because if human rights law exists it ought to be respected, 
obeyed, and enforced throughout the world.  To suggest that human rights 
need to be implemented incrementally, is to suggest that the Holocaust or 
Darfur could have been tolerated while changes were being made or that 
intervention would have only been appropriate if the incrementalism moved 
too slowly.  Part of the outrage, in this sense, stems from the fact that the 
Allies, in the case of the Holocaust, for example, knew what was going on, 
but took too long, perhaps under the rubric of territorial integrity, or because 
stopping the Holocaust was not as important as prosecuting the war, to 
prevent the slaughter of millions of people.  Notwithstanding that the 
Holocaust took place during the bloodiest of World Wars, and that the 
inviolable national-sovereignty principle was largely responsible for the rise 
of nationalism in Nazi Germany, is it fair to say in the modern context that 
the atrocities in Darfur are merely the culmination of tragedies borne out of 
a failed incrementalism?  In other words, what level of tolerance for the 
incremental implementation of human rights should a people have to bear 
before their human rights are violated?  Of course a distinction should be 
made between genocide and poverty and hunger, but how much latitude 
should nation-states be given in implementing and respecting human rights 
of all kinds?  It should be clear that the present author has very little 
patience for the margin of appreciation doctrine.184 
In this discussion one is right to ask what exactly are human rights?  The 
U.N. Training Manual on Human Rights Monitoring, another soft law 
instrument, defines them as the “universal legal guarantees protecting 
individuals and groups against actions by governments which interfere with 
fundamental freedoms and human dignity.”185  This is an ambiguous and 
ultimately unhelpful definition, if for no other reason that human rights also 
protect people from depredations of non-state actors.  As Louis Henkin puts 
it, controversial definitions are to be eschewed for a simpler one: “[by] 
‘human rights’ I mean simply those moral-political claims which, by 
contemporary consensus, every human being has or is deemed to have upon 
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his society and government . . . enumerated in contemporary international 
instruments . . . [such as] the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”186 
While Henkin takes an obviously broadminded point of view,187 if his 
comments are more closely read, it seems apparent that here he sees human 
rights as a claim made by an individual against his or her society or 
government.  This is a noteworthy approach because he—though perhaps 
unwittingly in the neo-realist sense—casts human rights once again, as 
something to be asserted against the nation-state.  One might ask, but 
against whom else other than society or government may such a claim be 
asserted?  While the answer to that question is more or less no one,188 the 
vital aspect to be here gleaned is that human rights exist in all of humankind 
a priori to existence of society or government.  In other words, in the 
present Author’s opinion, human rights exist prior to and without the 
existence of society or creation of government; they are something inherent 
in humankind. 
It is with the creation of the social contract with the sovereign—
Hobbesian, Lockean, or otherwise—in which individuals’ human rights 
become further threatened or abused by that sovereign or others.189  Life 
may be chaotic without the sovereign but human rights inherently exist 
nonetheless—in the state of nature you might kill me, but I still have the 
natural right to life.190  Thus, from a natural law point of view, human rights 
are universal, and therefore the most basic rights and freedoms are protected 
from interference by government or the nation-state.  Yet there appears to 
be view among some governments that there is no such thing as universal or 
fundamental human rights; there are simply the rights embodied in 
international instruments incorporated into domestic law, each interpreted in 
a multitude of ways by different governments and their courts.191 
Nevertheless, even if a straightforward approach to legally defining 
human rights is maintained, it might be said that perhaps the best way to do 
so is to understand the international instruments which construe them and 
impose legal obligations upon nation states to respect them.  Through such 
an approach one discovers what is known as the “International Bill of 
Rights.”192 
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The International Bill of Rights is not a single instrument, but rather 
comprised of four instruments: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(“UDHR”), the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights (“ICESCR”), the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (“ICCPR”), and the First Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.193  Remembering that the UDHR is 
not a treaty, the covenants which form the International Bill of Human 
Rights “comprise[] the most authoritative and comprehensive prescription 
of human rights obligations that governments undertake.”194  There are of 
course instruments which protect human rights such as the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, but these do not form a part of the International 
Bill of Rights.195 
A. International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights 
The ICSECR is now considered one of the “principal source[s] of 
international obligations” imposed on governments by international law.196  
(The other is the ICCPR).  Article 1 recognizes the right of all peoples to 
self-determination, including the right to “freely determine their political 
status,” pursue their economic, social, and cultural development and to 
manage and dispose of their natural wealth and resources. 197  It also obliges 
government to respect the right of peoples not to be deprived of their means 
of subsistence, and imposes a positive obligation on post-colonial societies 
to encourage and respect self-determination of peoples still governed by 
them. 
Article 2(1) obliges parties to the Covenant to “take steps, individually 
and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic 
and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to 
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the 
adoption of legislative measures.”198  With this provision, the legal onus is 
placed on sovereign governments, as state parties, to ensure that human 
rights are respected within their national (sovereign) territories and 
boundaries.  Article 2 also mandates ratifiers “to guarantee that the rights 
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enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination 
of any kind as to race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”199 
Articles 6 through 15 of the Covenant list the rights which state 
signatories must recognize and fulfill, among them the right: to work, under 
“just and favorable conditions,” with the right to form and join trade unions; 
to social security, including social insurance; to family life; to an adequate 
standard of living, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and the 
“continuous improvement of living conditions;” to “the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health;” to education; and to participation in 
cultural life.200  These then may be said to be some of the human rights that 
are referred to when the term is used. 
Precisely for reasons of national sovereignty, some nation-states, the 
foremost among them, the United States, have chosen not to ratify this 
instrument.  Although this instrument is a vehicle upon which the 
“progressive realization” of human rights supposedly travels, it remains to 
some degree as ineffectual as any other international treaty, unless ratified, 
respected and properly adhered to.201  Many nations ratify treaties with the 
aim of increasing their moral stature or esteem in the world, but with no 
intention of respecting them fully and abiding by the obligations imposed on 
them by them.202  In the end, assertions of national sovereignty under 
international law inevitably seem to get in the way.203  It should be noted, 
that the ICESR recognizes that poorer nations may only be able to fulfill 
certain rights incrementally.  The international community has the IMF and 
WHO, among other similar entities, to help these nations develop, and in 
accordance with Article 2, they should be provided with whatever assistance 
is necessary to respect human rights—therefore, there is no excuse, as far as 
the present Author is concerned. 
B. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
Articles 6 through 27 of the Covenant list the rights which state ratifiers 
must respect, among them the right: to life, protected by law; to be free 
from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or 
subjected without free consent to medical or scientific experimentation; to 
be free from slavery, servitude, forced or compulsory labor; to liberty and 
security of person and freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention; to due 
process in law; to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; and to the 
conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen 
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representatives.”204  Article 26 declares that “[a]ll persons are equal before 
the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection 
of the law.”205  Article 27 adds “[i]n those States in which ethnic, religious 
or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not 
be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to 
enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use 
their own language.”206  The first Optional Protocol provides to individuals 
procedural mechanisms to pursue redress to the Human Rights Committee 
for violations of the Covenant.207  Unlike the ICESCR, the United States has 
ratified the ICCPR; however, it did so with five reservations, five 
understandings, and four declarations, and one proviso.208 
In essence, the ICCPR and the ICESCR codify and impose obligations 
on nation-states to respect various human rights.  These obligations, by their 
very nature, as inroads on national sovereignty, turn the tables so to speak, 
and thwart the neo-realist brand of national sovereignty that has dominated 
Western thinking and practice since Nuremburg.209  In some sense, with the 
pursuit of human rights as the new normative organizing principle of the 
international system beyond merely protecting the “inviolability”210 of the 
nation-state, it might indeed be the case, as Fukuyama suggested, that “the 
end of history” is in the making or, already here.211  In other words, that 
western liberal democracy and its ideology of human rights ideals have 
triumphed over all other ideologies.212 
C. National Sovereignty v. International Human Rights 
From a legal point of view, is it then fair to say that national sovereignty 
and international human rights remain in opposition to one another?  Are 
the two like oil and water?  Mutually exclusive?  The answer to these 
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questions may have to do more with international politics than with 
international law.  In other words, legally speaking, all nations should be 
acting in accordance with international human rights law (or at least not 
frustrating its objectives); however, politically (and legally) speaking, they 
do not. Perhaps this is because of the “rule-book image of international law 
which refers to an understanding of law that (often implicitly) assumes that 
law is a body of rules that is separate from politics, neutral and universal.”213  
But this might simply evidence the fact that human rights are as much as 
political idea as they are a legal one.214 
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to understand four main theories when 
discussing why states agree to and often obey international human rights as 
a way of closing this part of the discussion: realism, institutionalism, 
constructivism, and liberalism.215  Strict realists make six basic assumptions 
about the world: (1) states are the primary and most powerful actors in the 
international sphere; (2) the world is anarchic; (3) since there is no power 
over states and no state may command another, there can be no order in 
international relations; (3) states seeks to maximize their security or power; 
(4) realists perceive the world as having limited resources that are unevenly 
distributed, so they see states as primarily focused on maximizing power 
and security; (5) states behave rationally in their pursuits of security or 
power; (6) there is utility in the use of force.216  The realist theory may not 
explain why states ratify international human rights treaties (and yet still 
obey them), but it does “help explain why international human rights 
monitoring is often quite weak.”217 
Institutionalism, unlike realism, focuses on the “gains that states obtain 
by cooperating with other nations in the context of inter-governmental 
relationships created by membership in international organizations.”218 
Constructivism holds that states come to accept norms and ideas through 
the processes of socialization and internationalism.  While realism and 
institutionalism are concerned with the pursuit of power, constructivism 
aims to understand the underlying reasons for pursuing power and other 
statist objectives to gain social acceptance within the international 
community.219 
Liberalism moves its focus from states to individual actors within a state 
and operates under three basic assumptions: (1) individuals and private 
groups are the primary actors in the states and also in the international 
sphere; (2) states represent some subset of the society; depending on whose 
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interests are represented, states will behave differently in international 
society; (3) state behavior is determined by the configuration of 
interdependent state preferences.220 
In support of full respect for human rights, this Note has adopted a 
liberal221 position and argued against the neorealist conception of the nation-
state and national sovereignty.  Thus, it is somewhat unsurprising that the 
present Author would disagree with legal positivist H.L.A. Hart, who in his 
seminal work The Concept of Law, wrote:  
 
The rules of international law . . . are often morally quite indifferent. A rule 
may exist because it is convenient or necessary to have some clear fixed rule 
about the subjects with which it is concerned, but not because any moral 
importance is attached to the particular rule.  It may well be but one of a large 
number of possible rules, any one of which would have done equally well.222 
 
Hart essentially argued that international law was legally indeterminate 
because it has no way of distinguishing coercive orders from moral 
commands, or in the end “primary and secondary rules” of obligation.223  
Furthermore, as an indeterminate and ineffectual body of law, Hart posited, 
there is no real way for what international law creates as a body of laws to 
be effectively enforced.  While his theory is far more intricate than is 
summarized here, he remains perhaps the foremost legal positivist of the 
twentieth century and important to consider in the context of this Note. 
Despite, however, the liberal perspective of this Note, Hart is incorrect224 
in this case; at least from a normative or constructive perspective on human 
rights.  Human rights should be seen on a par with jus cogens, which would, 
in effect, make them creatures of international law (if they actually became 
jus cogens).  More accurately, the present Author argues that human rights 
are inherent in humankind, and on this basis should be viewed as non-
derogable.  As alluded to earlier, law is not needed to create these rights; 
law is needed to enforce them.  Hart may take exception with this criticism 
because jus cogens are chimerical or nowhere positively commanded.  By 
contrast, the naturalist would say jus cogens devolve from a higher law than 
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that created by the nation-state; therefore, international human rights (as 
embodied in the concepts of jus cogens) should be seen as peremptory 
norms from which no derogation is permitted by any nation-state. 
To say that international law, at least international human rights law, is 
morally equivocated, is to deny the whole of humanity’s struggle for 
peaceful existence.  It is not necessarily the creation or absence of laws, 
international or otherwise, that has brought strife and misery to the worlds 
peoples,225 it is barbaric acts of slaughter and war that have done so.  
humankind’s inclination for war, if human history is any indication,226 has 
created precisely the opposite effect in law: instead of international law 
evolving to protect peoples it has evolved merely to protect nation-states 
and their ideologies.227  And the cycle of violence repeats itself.  “Foucault 
and Said both reject the idea that history is evolving towards a set of 
universal ideals.  Instead they view history as a series of struggles for 
domination that simply replace earlier struggles.”228  Fukuyama, on the 
other hand, sees history as ended with the triumph of liberal ideology.  Even 
though the present Author is not suggesting that law is unimportant unless it 
is moral, the international human rights norms that have emerged, may, on a 
philosophical level, be several among many that have emerged but they 
have emerged precisely for their moral and therefore legal importance. 
“The influence of the international human rights movement on the 
system of international law has been profound, to the point that it is no 
longer accurate to think of international law as strictly an interstate 
system.”229  Yet ardent neo-realists maintain the following position: 
Notwithstanding, the importance of human rights is a matter of relativity.  
Before us is a world of various actors with nation-States at its core.  
National rights and societal interests still matter.  Just as sovereignty is not 
absolute, nor are human rights.  Although some aspects of human rights, 
such as the right to be free from genocide, slavery and torture, may be said 
to be inflexible or nearly inflexible, most aspects of human rights are 
inherently subject to some degree of limitation . . . limitations of human 
rights illustrate that States’ willingness and agreement to participate in the 
international protection of individual rights have not placed individual 
rights above national sovereignty and societal interests.  The States 
remain the cornerstone of international law, including international human 
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rights law, irrespective of whether one regards that law to be perfect and 
effective or not.230 
Such a view seems naïve.  The reasons why these limitations exist and more 
profound changes have not been realized in the effort to secure full respect 
or realization for human rights is because the nation-state has dominated 
and preempted many of the sustained efforts to remove these limitations.  
Consistently maintaining such a view is nonsensical and myopic.231  What 
Shen and other international neo-realists realists fail to grasp232 is that 
modern sovereignty is “defined by the language of a human rights culture.  
If a population is helpless to defend itself against tyranny, it is of little 
comfort that a state otherwise is in control of its territory, and that its 
government is able ‘to provide security, economic stability and a measure of 
prosperity, clean air and water,’ and so on.”233  Take the situation in 
Afghanistan as an example: “[a]utocratic elites have learned to fight 
historical inevitability by destroying the engines of social progress.  The 
cultural Luddites of the Taliban, by disempowering women and dismantling 
their society’s educational and health infrastructure, hope to delay their own 
eventual overthrow.”234  Whether this overthrow is by the people or the 
result of another nation-state’s intervention remains a mystery.  
Nonetheless, the preceding section has discussed some of the legal 
instruments in which international human rights are embodied, argued that 
national sovereignty manifests in a particular kind of legal-philosophic 
consciousness, and argued that sovereignty is changing from an 
international legal principle that protects the territorial boundaries of the 
state, to one which protects people and human rights. 
V. THE END OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND THE SUZERAIN WORLD 
POLITY 
A. The End of National Sovereignty? 
Modern globalization has changed the international legal landscape. “We 
live now in a human rights culture.”235  The supremacy of national 
sovereignty has been whittled away by the global demand for human rights 
and citizens “pressing their government for better treatment at the hands of 
the police, for cleaner air and fairer distribution of environmental harms, or 
for universal health care or the special educational needs of a minority 
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group.”236  As Stacy points outs, “[h]uman rights claims no longer depend 
on geographic limitations, and may be as appropriately addressed to the 
broader international community as they are to a nation state’s sovereign . . . 
.  Human rights today are based upon a much richer construction of the 
human subject than either the Hobbesian subject or the Lockean citizen.”237 
If national sovereignty is no longer the supreme paradigm in 
international legal dialogue and the demand for international human rights 
is one of the forces driving the global community towards full respect of 
them, does that truly mean the nation-state itself is dying or is dead?  If 
national-sovereignty is dead, does this mean the only way full respect for 
human rights to be achieved is indeed by abolition of the nation-state or 
national sovereignty?  Although most governments of the world would 
never agree, and would take up arms in support of their position, the answer 
to a large degree is yes.  Inversely, that is why full respect for human rights 
will never be achieved so long as sovereignty can be invoked as both a 
sword and a shield against human rights in the international legal sphere.  
This is simply the reality of the international legal order and the 
mythologies invested into it. 
The mythology of national sovereignty Henkin has referred to manifests 
eloquently in Mathew Olmsted’s brilliant study of pre and post-colonial 
societies and the so-called “failed state” vis-à-vis international human rights 
and national sovereignty.  In this study he writes: 
[I]nternational law has used the civilization, nation-state, and self-
determination standards to achieve its universalizing and dividing project.  
Through this project, international law has placed diverse communities of 
cultures, peoples, and histories in a double prison.  First, these 
communities have been imprisoned in the imaginative geography of the 
colonial nation-state, and second, these artificial nation-states have been 
imprisoned within an international order that seeks to preserve them into 
perpetuity through territorially delimited legal norms . . . .  The individual 
histories of these various cultures and peoples are interrupted, erased, and 
replaced by the history of the colonial nation-state . . . .  Far from 
promoting progress, nation-building and self-determination have 
effectively silenced the progress of thousands of pre-colonial narratives.  
In Nietzsche, Genealogy and History, Foucault finds legal rules “are 
empty in themselves, violent and unfinalized” that can be bent to any 
purpose by those who are able to seize them.  The “universal” norms of 
self-determination and sovereignty illustrate this point by showing that the 
way one defines a legal term, and who does the defining, can have a 
profoundly homogenizing and controlling effect on those against whom 
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the term is employed. Moreover, these norms show how words can project 
into the future the arbitrary and senseless violence of the past.238 
This Note has argued that national sovereignty is, in essence, a legal 
consciousness.  The corollary to this argument is that only in the absence of 
this consciousness can full respect for international human rights emerge.  
Thus, to initially answer the fundamental question this Note addresses, 
while this legal consciousness has changed, and despite its decaying vitality, 
it seems apposite to conclude—willy-nilly a choice that is freely made—
that full respect for human rights can only be achieved or will only be 
achieved by the abolition of the nation-state.  But national sovereignty is 
here to stay, at least for a few more years—there is nothing on the horizon 
indicating any changes to the contrary.  Sovereignty is instead, however, 
“becoming defined by the different nature of the social contract, a contract 
that must account for the increasingly complex range of transnational 
interactions under the conditions of globalization, and also the enlarging 
role of international human rights norms as benchmarks of good governance 
and good sovereignty.”239  In the final analysis, it is not “so important 
whether we replace sovereignty with another concept or whether we speak 
about changes of its content, as long as we are aware of the trends of 
development.”240  These trends indicate that sovereignty protects, or should 
protect, peoples as much as it protects borders. 
B. Global Governance and Human Rights? 
How then is this new form of international organization, i.e. global 
governance to be achieved?  One of the results of the post-Westphalian 
system, in fact a defining feature, is the sublimation of sovereignty into 
transnational international organizations.241  On a regional scale, examples 
of this are the E.U., North American Free Trade Agreement, Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations, and MERCOSUR; global examples are the 
W.T.O., and the U.N., among others already referred to in this Note. 
All these organizations together comprise a system of global governance 
predicated on free trade and the belief that free trade encourages peace.  
That is the definition of the post-Westphalian international system.  At the 
same time as the nation-state is declining in importance, individual rights 
and duties under international law are increasingly important.  This leads 
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to the conclusion that we are now in a different legal landscape than that 
described by realist state theory and the Westphalian state system.242 
This different legal landscape is defined and will be further developed by 
the participation of civil society in the democratization of the international 
system, i.e. moving away from the principles of classic international law.  
So far, in the absence of an integrated strategy, efforts have been ad hoc, as 
civil society—economic elites among them—aim to create their own 
“mechanisms of influence.”243  The creation of the International Criminal 
Court is an example of civil society exerting such influence on nation-states 
in the international system; it was, in effect, civil society that was the 
catalyst for the creation of the ICC.244  There is no reason not to expect 
greater participation by these aggregated networks of people—civil 
society—in international law, especially in the field of human rights.  The 
world knows this to be the future of humankind, and for what it’s worth, 
albeit it somewhat flocculent, the U.N. has recognized the inevitability of 
civil society’s continued participation in the international system: “Our 
times demand a new definition of leadership—global leadership.  They 
demand a new constellation of international cooperation—governments, 
civil society and the private sector, working together for a collective global 
good.”245  An integrated strategy is needed, however, if full respect for 
human rights is to be achieved in a global governance scheme.  A 
coordinated effort, in whatever form that might eventually manifest, 
however, represents the middle road between the abolition of the nation-
state and full respect for human rights.  Such a solution, however, must 
come from outside the United Nations as it has become effete as an 
international institution.246 
C. The Suzerain World Polity 
As discussed earlier, scholars Falk and Strauss have proposed a global 
parliament that would exist in conjunction with the national sovereignty 
system.  Under their model, such an “assembly would not be constituted by 
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states.  Because its authority would come directly from the global citizenry, 
it could refute the claim that states are bound only by laws to which they 
give their consent.  Henceforth, the ability to opt out of collective efforts to . 
. . safeguard human rights, or otherwise protect the global community could 
be challenged.”247  Falk and Strauss therefore essentially suggest that this 
assembly could exert a certain political influence over nation-states to such 
an extent that it could not be ignored.  This assembly, they suggest, would 
keep nation-states globally accountable for their actions and transgressions 
in respect of human rights. 
Recognizing that the current international system lacks reliable 
enforcement mechanisms, they in turn argue that the assembly would be 
able to better encourage compliance with human rights norms.248  They 
weakly cite the “mobilization of shame” theory as support for this 
contention, arguing further that “a popularly elected global assembly would 
be more visible and credible than are existing watchdogs who [sic] expose 
corporate and governmental wrongdoing.”249  Apart from not suggesting 
how such a parliament would be funded or providing any ideas for rules of 
procedure, most significantly, they do not suggest any mechanisms that 
would legally bind international states to respect, observe, and participate in 
the global parliament.  Nor do they suggest how to legally ensure 
compliance with already existing international human rights laws and 
norms.  In other words, at bottom their theory really leaves the door wide 
open for continued assertions of the importance of national sovereignty over 
human rights and other international human rights concerns. 
Thus, as a question posed at the outset of this paper, may a one world 
government, or suzerain entity, which by legal authority binds all the 
sovereign nation-states of the world into full compliance and respect for 
human rights, be contemplated as the ultimate inroad upon national 
sovereignty?  It seems a fantastic possibility and an unlikely one.  It is 
difficult to imagine that even with the decay that national sovereignty has 
suffered that it will ever truly die.  In other words, “[g]lobal governance will 
come not at the expense of the state but rather as an expression of the 
interests that the state embodies.  As the source of order and basis of 
governance, the state will remain in the future as effective, and will be as 
essential, as it has ever been.”250 
CONCLUSION 
Full respect for universal human rights will not be achieved by the 
abolition of the nation-state now, or at some point even far into the future.  
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For practical reasons of history, politics, and law, it is just an impossible 
scenario.  Even though it may not be the ruling paradigm in international 
law anymore, the nation-state is still the fundamental building block of the 
international legal order.  Take for example the Arab-Israeli conflict as an 
illustrative example: the Palestinians demand a state of their own (or the 
‘return’ of their state, depending on how one views the situation) as much as 
they demand redress for claimed human rights violations by Israel.  If, in the 
paradigm of the international order national sovereignty did not matter, why 
else would the peace process repeatedly include the creation of a Palestinian 
state as one of its main objectives?251 
But all this goes to show is that human rights are a means, not an end.252  
The end, however, is the kind of society that human rights proponents and 
activists aim to secure.  It is a kind of world (or nation-states), defined by 
law, natural law, which they seek.  In turn, this vision is too informed by a 
particular type of legal consciousness borne out of liberal democratic 
ideals.253  Human rights are merely the means by which achieve this desired 
end, which is a world where peace, prosperity and the human rights of every 
individual on earth are truly inviolable.  However, the creation of such a 
world is no easy task and has the potential to shake the pillars of history.254 
The principle of national sovereignty invoked as a shield against human 
rights abuses and violations may have decayed, but as the neo-realists point 
out, is in no danger of dying anytime soon.  The nation-state is a slightly 
different matter as state power is being dispersed among economic elites 
and civil society.255  Thus, perhaps coming as a relief to many “New World 
Order” conspiracy theorists, a world where full respect for human rights is 
achieved will not be attained by the creation of a one world government 
exercising suzerainty over the various nation-states of the world.  To 
reiterate, neither will it come with the abolition of the nation state, for 
abolition of national sovereignty could equally mean nothing of the 
international system as we know it would be left; we might descend into 
anarchy and chaos without the intactness of national sovereignty.256  
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“Sovereignty may one day be superseded,” writes Roth, “but not as a direct 
consequence of either the diminishing efficacy of unilateral regulation or 
the proliferation of international legal norms.  It signifies not an absence of 
international legality, but a set of legal premises.257 
In the end, human rights have to be continually integrated into the 
evolving national sovereignty dialectic in order to see their full 
realization—it is a never ending process.  We must move away from the 
idea that national sovereignty butts up against international human rights or 
viewing them in opposition to one another.  It should be possible to 
understand the changing nature of sovereignty “even though nation-states 
will continue to dominate the international system in the immediate term, 
despite the partial emergence of an international or global civil society.”258  
As one commentator puts it: 
No one is entitled to complain that things are getting too complicated.  If 
complexity of decision is the price for increased human dignity on the 
planet, it is worth it.  Those who yearn for “the good old days” and 
continue to trumpet terms like “sovereignty” without relating them to the 
human rights conditions within . . . states . . . do more than commit an 
anachronism.  They undermine human rights.259 
Those who do throw in the towel to this fight, indeed mark the “end of 
history.”  Whether the end of history is marked by the ideological triumph 
of national sovereignty or the ideological triumph of international human 
rights in the age of liberal democracy will only be determined by posterity.  
Hopefully they will inherit our imagination for universal human rights, and 
less of our inhumanity. 
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